Barter and Economic Disintegration Author(s): Caroline Humphrey Source: Man, New Series, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Mar., 1985), pp. 48-72 Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2802221 . Accessed: 29/05/2013 07:27 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Man. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 128.232.249.79 on Wed, 29 May 2013 07:27:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions BARTER AND ECONOMIC CAROLINE DISINTEGRATION HUMPHREY University ofCambridge The mainstreameconomists'view thatbartershould be seen as a 'natural'phenomenonof humannatureand as the originof moneyis rejected.Barteroccursin specificsocio-economic conditionswhichmay obtainalso in economieswhichknow money.Whenthereis a verylow supplyof currency,money may cease to functionas an index of value forall goods and itself become an item bartered.This is likelyto occur when small discretesocial groups wish to transaction beforevalueis maintainautonomy.Unlikemoneypayment,whichrequiresa further realised,bartersatisfiesdemand immediatelyand is of its naturediscontinuous.As with car trade-insin oureconomybarteroccurswhenpeoplecannotaffordtokeepmoney,anditbecomes a systemwhen societyis atomisedto the extentthatpeople do not exploit the variationsin Nepal, communities.Using thecaseoftheLhomiofnorth-east exchangeratiosbetweendifferent itis shownthatalthoughtheexchangeofcommonproduce,as opposed to rarevaluables,is most likelyto approximateto a notional'equilibriumprice',thepracticeofbarterwithno established indexofvalue/numeraire. measuresofweightandvolumemeansthattherecanbe no underlying Each transactionexistsvirtuallyon its own. Thus, althoughbarteris an egalitarianmode, it containsno protectionagainstchangingexchangeratioswhich may harmone partner.Barter tendsto takeplace betweenpeople who knowone another,becauseitis onlybytheestablishment of customarytimesand places forexchangethatthecostsof searchingforpartners,waitingetc. areavoided. Delayed barter,whichoftenoccurswithvaluables,requiresnon-economicmeansof which the Lhomi employ are selfensuringrepayment,but the ritualisedtrade-partnerships world of thecapitalist relationscut tradersofffromthewide, unpredictable limiting:restricted end sale. Businessoftenfailsand thetraderssuffer. Barteris at once a cornerstoneof moderneconomic theoryand an ancient subjectof debateabout politicaljustice,fromPlato and Aristotleonwards.In bothdiscourses,whicharedistinctthoughrelated,barterprovidestheimagined be preconditionsfor the emergenceof money. Why should anthropologists in logicaldeductionsfroman imaginedstate?No exampleofa barter interested economy,pure and simple,has ever been described,let alone the emergence suggeststhatthereneverhas been fromit of money;all availableethnography dominated by sucha thing.But thereareeconomiestodaywhicharenevertheless ancient debate. from and add to the can both learn and here anthropology barter, In Plato, non-monetaryexchange provides the firstmeans of satisfying needsestablishedbythedivisionoflabour,whichis a condition complementary of the ideal Republic (Plato I908: II, 369-72). Aristotledevelops the idea of 'proportionalexchange',relativeto social evaluationsof theworthof persons ofwhatisjust. Here money,whichcan and theirproducts,in his consideration measureeverything,is introducedby conventionas a 'kind of substitutefor Man (N.S.) 20, 48-72 This content downloaded from 128.232.249.79 on Wed, 29 May 2013 07:27:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CAROLINE HUMPHREY 49 need or demand', its value being derived not from nature but from law orthodoxy,on the (AristotleI895: 5, I-I7). Economistsof the contemporary otherhand, which stems at least fromAdam Smithand was revivedin the marginalist economicsofMengerandJevonsandreachesClower in thepresent, propose an evolutionarydevelopmentof economieswhichplaces barter,as a at themostprimitivestage,to be supersededby 'natural'humancharacteristic, monetaryexchange as soon as people become aware of the latter'sgreater efficiency. oftheprimitive Anthropologists havealso tendedto see barteras a transaction economy, although in the classic examples, such as Malinowski (I922), Thurnwald(I934-5) andcomdiversity and Sahlins(I972) theethnographic is recognised.Dominatedby otheractivitiesconsidered plexityof distribution to be 'more socially embedded', such as ceremonialexchange,gift-giving, sharingof food, or dues to chiefs,barteris foundin a cornerof theeconomy alike. Barter, -and one thatis despised by the people and anthropologists is 'negative accordingto Sahlinssummarisinga wide rangeof ethnography, as 'haggling',barteris held reciprocity, theunsociableextreme'.Characterised to takeplace withoutsiders,alongwith'chicanery'and 'theft',eachparticipant tryingto outwittheotherwithan eye to his own benefit(I972: I95). Thereis somethingunsatisfactory abouteach of thesemodernarguments.If we take barterto be the more or less simultaneousexchangeof one good for have no justifianotherwiththepossibilityof bargaining,theanthropologists cation in regardingit as 'negative reciprocity'.By definition,barteris a bargainsuntilhe or she is complementary exchangein whicheach participant satisfied.It does not necessarilyimplyantagonism.As faras the economists' argumentis concerned,we know fromtheaccumulatedevidenceof ethnography that barterwas indeed very rare as a system dominatingprimitive economies.' Money of variouskindshas been aroupdforover two millennia, and in thelast century,in itspurest,non 'commodity-money' form,has penetratedvirtuallyeveryeconomy on earth,and yetbarteris common todayin economieswhichalso know money.I shallproposein thisarticlethatbarterin worldis, in thevastmajorityof cases,a post-monetary thepresent phenomenon economieswhichare, or (i.e. it coexistswithmoney),and thatit characterises have become, de-coupled from monetarymarkets.In these circumstances to whichmoneyitselfis bartercan become a dominantprincipleoftransaction, subject.As was well known to Marx and even Aristotle(I895: 5, 14), but has somehow escaped the generalattentionof anthropologists, currencymay be barteredlikeanyothercommodity. As an idea 'barter'is partof thehistoryofeconomicsand anthropology,and theassumptionthatitwas theforerunner ofmonetaryexchangeis crucialin the way it is normallyconceptualised.Polanyi'ssuggestion,in Thegreattransformation,thatthe evolutionarydoctrineof the economistspreoccupiedwith the emergenceof marketsmightvirtuallybe reversed,has been largelyignored (I957: 58).2 His own view is considerablycloser to thatof the ancientphilosophers,suggestingas he does thepriorexistenceof long-distancetradeas a differences and only laterthe emergenceof resultof regionalenvironmental local marketsand bargainingor barter.In thisarticleI shouldalso liketo escape This content downloaded from 128.232.249.79 on Wed, 29 May 2013 07:27:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 50 CAROLINE HUMPHREY fromthenotionof 'truck'or 'barter'as a naturalhumanpropensitywhichstill oftwo concepts appearsas a mythofour subject.This impliesthedisentangling of barter,(a) the notion of a simple exchangeof goods withoutmoney and withoutspecifyingthe mode of the non-monetarytransaction,and (b) the processof barterin timeas a practicewhichinvolvesbargaining.It is thelatter thatwill be myfocus. The word barteras I use it impliesan open-ended,potentiallyinnovative, in whichneednotonlyanswersneedbutcan also create negotiable,transaction, a new demand:'If you don't wantthesepotatoes,perhapsyou would likethis barter,which in itselfrefersonly to a social pair of scissors?'Furthermore, and notto economicvalues,canencompasstheidea ofan relationoftransaction exchangeof goods whichhave one value to one side and anotherto theother.I use 'barter'in thissense to differentiate it from'primitivetrade'in which,as ratesof exchangeoutweighbargainMalinowskishowed, sociallydetermined ingin thegreatmajorityof typesoftransaction. For barterto become dominantin an area, such thatit can incorporateeven social puremoney,we mustsupposenotonlyeconomicbutalso someparticular and culturalconditionswhichallow the 'construction'of barteras a system.I shallattemptto describethison thebasisoftheeconomyoftheLhomi3andtheir neighboursof theNepal-Tibetborderin I979-80. The Lhomi are farmersbut between the also traders,and clearlytheirhistoricalrole as intermediaries of theNepali highlandpastoraleconomyof theTibet hillsand theagriculture hills,is a basis forthecultureof tradingwhichtheyfindso attractive.I would argue, however, thatit is not because the Lhomi were tradersthattheynow monetised. engagein barter.SimilarHimalayanpeoplesarenow almostentirely Clearlytherearemanyconditionsrangingfromnegativeconsequencesofusing in centralisedeconomies5which money4to regulatedsystemsof distribution as it default. In othercases, themselves were by to barter mightimpel people in from one another context,bartermay be ideological greatly differing of East Coast American cite in the itself. We example may positivelypreferred whereproductswere farmers ofthelateeighteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries, exchangedbetweenindependenthouseholdsand even cash was barteredjust outside New York. Merrill(I977: 42-7I) explainsthisrejectionof capitalist, based monetisedfarmingas an expressionofradicalrepublicanism, functionally householdproduction.It is certainlynot thecase on essentiallyindividualistic thatsuch examples are simply'survivals'of earlyformsof economy. From historicaland comparativematerialsin theHimalayanregionit can be seenthat monetisedtradein periodsof accumulation, alternations betweenincreasingly and barter,whichin myview is herea phenomenonofeconomicdisintegration in theverticaleconomy,have beenhighlyunstable. To show theoretically whythisis thecase we mustlook attheeconomicideas looks at in moredetail.The prevalenttheoryofbarterin theeconomicliterature theroleandoriginof barter,notinitself,butwiththeprimaryaimofelucidating (I9I0), statesthatbarteris abandoned money.Clower (I969), followingJevons because of its high transactioncosts. In an imaginedislandeconomywithout moneyit is assumedthatpeople have a naturaldesireto acquiregoods theydo not produce themselvesand thereforeengage in exchange. With an elegant This content downloaded from 128.232.249.79 on Wed, 29 May 2013 07:27:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CAROLINE HUMPHREY S series of curves, Clower suggeststhat the costs involved in simple barter (searchingforexchangepartners,establishinga double coincidenceof wants, postponinga desiredtransaction,and wastingtimein bargaining)would lead forparticular thento establishtrading-posts peoplefirstto barteratfairgrounds, goods, thento makeuse oftheone mostcommonitemas a meansofexchangeat all thepostsand,finally,to establishthiscommodityalso as a standardofvalue, means of paymentand storeof wealth,in otherwords, as money. Here the primaryfunctionof moneyis assumedto be as a meansofexchange. Thomas Crump, who has made a surveyof both the economic and the anthropologicalliterature,argues convincingly,however, that Clower is wrong(I98 I: 85). Because thesupplyofmoneymustbe undersome control,6it is unlikelythatany good emergingas theprimarymeansof exchangethrough frequencyof use in barter-which is what Clower suggested-would ever 'turninto' money. There is an alternativetheory,again dealingwithbarteronly as a seed-bed forthe emergenceof money,but one whichis, I think,more usefulto us in barteritself.The economistCharlesGoodhartarguesagainstthe understanding Clower school on thegroundsthatmoneyas themeansof exchangeemerging fromprimitivebartercannotbe theinitialkey,sincethisalreadyassumesthe He is concernedto makea existenceofa marketeconomyand marketmentality. distinction betweenmoneyas a meansofexchangeanditsnarrowerfunctionas goods a meansofpayment.He seesthelatteras primary.Bartercoulddistribute costs,most (and thusrenderpaymentunnecessary)but,becauseof transaction exchangeswillnotbe simultaneousbutwillinvolvetheextensionofcredit.The existenceoftimemeansthatevenin an economyrigidlyboundby customthere e.g. about weather,futuretechnology,or thehonestyof mustbe uncertainty, in communities people. Delayed bartercould onlyexistgenerallyinface-to-face whicheveryexchangepartnerhasknowledgeaboutotherssuchthathe cantrust paymentto be made foritemsgiven.But thisis unlikelyeverto be thecase, and lack of information about thefuturecreditstandingof prospectivepurchasers would in some casesforcepeople to use a specialisedmeansofpayment,money. settledby monetaryexchangeswillrisewiththe The proportionoftransactions growing complexityand dispersionof the economy because of the greater about otherpeople. Conversely, liklihoodof nothavingadequateinformation the use of money declineswith the developmentof methods,such as credit available(I975: 7-8).7 cards,to increasetheamountofpersonalinformation All thisis veryformalistic, butitdoes helpus to see somethingoftheessential natureof barter.Bartermakespaymentunnecessary.Paymentis the transfer fromone person to anotherof an interestwhich is expressedin termsof a standardof value. It is moneywhich makespaymentpossible,as Crump has it forcefully pointedout. The keypointaboutmoneyis that,whateverfunctions mayhave, thepayeeis in a positionto performthemby virtueofthepayment, but he can onlydo so by makinga further payment.Thus it is of thenatureof (Crump I98I: 3-4). Barter,on theotherhand, moneyto circulateindefinitely entailsno furthertransaction.It is, in principle,a one-offaffair,because the objectsexchangedare mainlyobjectsforuse. Barteragreementsare made by and withoutanyimplicit individualsor groupsseparatelyand discontinuously, This content downloaded from 128.232.249.79 on Wed, 29 May 2013 07:27:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 52 CAROLINE HUMPHREY standardof value (thisis discussedfurther on p. 60). The implicationis that, unliketheuse of money,barterexchangewill have theeffectof dis-integration in theregionaleconomy. This gives some clues as to whicheconomiesare likelyto be dominatedby barter.Barterwill occurwheneconomiesareatomised(whenmoneyceasesto functionas a standardof value). 'Delayed barter',whichin practicemayrange from somethingclose to 'primitivetrade' to the activitiesof professional merchantsintenton keepingpeople in thrall(Leach I959: I45-6 and Gorer I938: I I3-i8) can onlyoccurwhenthereis a largeamountofinformation about partners(or othersocial pressuresforrepayment).A further importantconditionis suggestedby an earlypaper of Helms. She proposedtheidea of the 'purchasesociety' which characterises groups on the fringesof incompletely centralised states(Helms i969). Suchgroupsexistin a complexrelationbetween politicalautonomyfromand economicdependenceon thecentralsociety.Her pointis thatthepeople are'hooked' on goods fromoutsideandcharacteristically quicklybecome monetised.However, thereare societiesin a similarpolitical situationwhichresistmonetisation(Harrissi982), in particularas represented by moneymarketsin land and labour. Other groups may be forced out of the money economy. Crump has suggesteda usefulmodel based on thenotionof upperand lower limitsto the supplyofmoney(i98i: 83-96). As we havenotedinthecaseofcowries(note6), an object cannot functionas 'pure money', in Crump's terminology,if the has been supplyis unlimited(upperlimit).Only aftersupplyofthemoney-stuff subjectto limitation,eitherby transportto a different regionor because it is manufacturedin a situationof control,will it functionas money. Flowing throughthis area, money passes to other regionsin progressivelysmaller amounts,endingup in whatCrump callsa 'sink'(thelowerlimit),'represented by a populationwhichimportstheseobjects,but not so as to use themforany cannotbe recognisablemonetarypurpose' (i98i: 86). In thesink,money-stuff used as money because thereis not enough of it around. A peripheralselfcontainedsub-economymust maintaina positivebalance of paymentsin its externaltradewith the nationaleconomyif it is to importenough moneyto maintainitsown monetarysystem.In practice,simplepovertymakesthisvery problematicin manyregionsoftheworld,evenin placesadjacentto monetised markettowns(i98 I: 2I2). It is what goes on in this'sink' thatwe shallbe concernedwith.I agreewith Crump thatthe supply of moneyis crucial.Simplyto say thatan economy operatesbelow thelowerlimitofmoneysupplytellsus little,however,ofwhat actuallyhappens.As we shallsee (p. 62) thelevel of thesupplyof moneydoes not explainthevalue whichmoneyhas in a bartereconomy.For thiswe must look at barteritself,and hereI turnto theLhomiethnography. TheLhomi The Lhomi are a smallcommunityoffarmers and traderslivingin thevalleyof the Arun River close to the Tibetan border.They are Buddhistsand speak a dialectof Tibetan. Separatedby a precipitous,uninhabited jungle fromtheir This content downloaded from 128.232.249.79 on Wed, 29 May 2013 07:27:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CAROLINE HUMPHREY 53 neighboursto thesouth,theylive in a dozen or so compactvillagesperchedon thesteepmountainslopes.This is a 'verticaleconomy'withmanysimilarities to theAndeancase. The landsattachedto villagesrangefromyakpasturageabove thetree-line(i6,ooo ft),throughcattleandsheeppasture,swidden,andfieldsfor potato, wheat and barley on the upper levels (I0-I2,000 ft), maize, millet, and vegetablesat village level (6,ooo-io,oooft), and buckwheat,fruit-trees terracesof ricerightdown neartheriverat approximately3,000 ft.Although eachvillageproducesa rangeofcrops,evenslightdifferences inheight,sunlight and rainfallmagnifythevariationsin whattheycan produceas surplus. The Lhomi farmis owned by and productionis organisedon thebasis ofthe household.Patrilinealclanshave rightsto pasturesand residualrightsto fields, andlandis notfreelyavailableforsale.8The moresenioroftheclansalso provide theinheritedpositionsof villageheadman(goba) and tax-collectors(gyembu). oftheseleadersbeensupersededby Onlyin thelastio-i 5 yearshastheauthority thatof electedpanchayatofficialsof the Nepalese state.About 3 per cent. of householdshave no land,just a fewmorethanthenumberoffamiliesof'gara', i.e. thoseof'uncleanmouth'.Otherwise,theovertideologytodayis egalitarian, despitethe factthatthoseclans callingthemselves'jimi' (originalsettlers)still tendto have morericeland thanlaterarrivals.These latter,knownas 'Kampa' althoughtheycome fromvariouspartsofTibet,are,however,sometimesrich in livestock,sincetheyarrivedwithherdsof yaksand yak-crosseswhichhave stillnot yetbeen entirelydepleted.Though mosthouseholdshave a fewcattle, pigs and chickens,only around20 per cent.have sheep,and veryfew indeed have yaks. There is virtuallyno wage-labour.Exchange-labour(nga-lak)is by farthepredominantform,thoughpoorermen and women may work forthe odd day or two forpay in cash,grains,saltor garlic.Basically,Lhomiexpectto live offtheproduceoftheirfarmsand to barteror,occasionally,sellthesurplus. Thereis evidencethatthepeople oftheupperArunvalleywerericherin the to theperiodaround i8io, nineteenthcenturythantheyare today. Referring HamiltondescribesHatiyaon theArunandAlangchang(Wallungchung)on the TamarRiveras thetwo great'marts'fortheimportant Tibet-Indiatrade,which passed throughnorth-eastNepal. Goods were broughtto thenorthernmarts fromthe town of Chayenpur(Chainpur), where therewas a fortand the residenceof the administrative officerof the Gorkhagovernment(Hamilton I8I9: I56-7). Hatiya today has no marketof any kind, and Wallungchung, intheI950's (von Fiirer-Haimendorf tradeentrepot whichwas stillan important I975: I25), was largelysweptaway by a landslidearoundI970. Itis notclearto whatextenttheearlynineteenth centurytradewas monetised. Hamiltondistinguishes betweenperiodicmarkets(hat),wheremoneywas used, for which he gives a list for east Nepal, and 'marts', such as Hatiya and Wallungchung,which were not marketsbut entrepots,where goods were in theI840's exchangedprimarily bybarter.HookerremarksforWallungchung thatit had no marketor bazaar and thatit was only by threatsthathe could obtain rice there(Hooker I854: 2I8). It is to Sagant thatwe owe the useful distinction betweenthebazaar,themarketand thefair,all ofwhichuse money, and the'mart'whichoperatesprimarilyby barter.SagantsuggeststhatHatiya was probablynota market(SagantI968-9: I I I-I2), butagainstthiswe havethe This content downloaded from 128.232.249.79 on Wed, 29 May 2013 07:27:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 54 CAROLINE HUMPHREY factofitsnamewhichwas surelyderivedfromtheNepali wordformarket(hat). In any case, money was of course present in north-eastNepal in the early nineteenthcentury.The headmen ('guobah')of the Upper Arun and animalsin rupees Wallungchungcollectedtaxes on trade-goodsand transport (Hooker I854: I6o; von Fiirer-Haimendorf I975: i I6). They were politically powerfulenough to maintainmonopolieson tradethroughthesevalleysand keepstrangers out (HamiltonI8I9: I54 and HookerI854:230-I). Also, the wool trade was always monetised.Traders paid money ir advance to the Tibetanshepherds,theadvantageof thisfromtheirpointof view beingthatin thisway theycould stabiliseprices.In theearlytwentieth century, thevolumeof thevalue ofTibetancurrency.If thewool tradewas so greatthatit determined therewas a largewool crop one yearso manyIndianrupeesflowedintoTibet thatthevalueoftherupeewould fallas againsttheTibetantrang-ka. Conversely, ifthecropwas poor, thevalue oftherupeerose(Bell I928: I I7). The wool trade becameimportantin north-east Nepal in themiddleofthenineteenth century. What does seem apparentis thatthemonetisationof particularplaces could rise and fallquite rapidlyin thisregionof the Himalayas. Das mentions,for ofDarjeeling, example,thatin I9OI therewas onlya cowshedatGok, northeast whereformerly therehad beentwelveshops (Das I902: 2I). In theLhomi areafurther is thelargenumber evidenceofpreviousprosperity of Buddhisttemples(gompa)attachedto each village.Many of themare now Theirlandshave shrunkto small virtuallyunused,and all arepoverty-stricken. plots, and the buildingsare bare shells. The valuable statuesand paintings, whichsome Lhomimaintainedhadbeenstolen,wereperhapssold bythelamas, as I was toldby others.In thepast,landwas morefreelyboughtand sold thanit is today. The gompas,which acquired substantialwealth from donations, engagedin tradeand boughtland. Temple land was workedby thevillagersin returnforthereligiousservicesofthelamas. Let us look now at themodernbartereconomy.Beforethevirtualclosureof theTibetanborderby theearlyI970's whichfollowedtheChineseinvasion,the Lhomi engaged in threekinds of barter.First,therewas inter-villagedirect anditemsgatheredfromtheforests,e. g. exchangeofsurplusfoods,handicrafts maize forpotatoes,wool fortobacco,wild garlicforrice,etc. This small-scale barterwas carriedout not only betweenLhomi villages but perhapsmore betweenLhomi and theirneighboursto thesouth,Gurungs,Rais, importantly Limbus, Bahuns and Chhetris,all of whom are relativelyprosperousgrain farmers. Secondly,regularand large-scalebarterof agricultural producetook place eachyearin exchangefortheproduceoftheTibetanlivestockeconomy,butter, driedfatsand meats,woven woollen clothes,ropes,sacks,rugs,andblanketsof yakhair.The Lhomi stillsee pastoralproductsas essentialforexistencein their culture,providingtheirown kindof food,dress,utensilsand objectsof value, fromthoseofthe'Gorkha'(Nepalese)peoplesto thesouth.In radicallydifferent theirown eyestheLhomithemselves(shing-sa-wa, 'field-earth-people') provide halfat that.But the fromtheirfarmingproduce,and theinferior onlya half-life enblocto thenorthern retreated sidewhen Tibetannomadicpastoralists (drog-pa) theborderwas closed,becausethatis wherethegood high-altitude pasturesare. This content downloaded from 128.232.249.79 on Wed, 29 May 2013 07:27:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CAROLINE HUMPHREY 55 Only thesepasturesaresuitableforherdingyaks,yak-crossesandTibetantypes ofsheepand goats. Thirdly,therewas long-distancetradeof salt, acquiredby the nomads in Tibet, forgrains(mainlyrice) acquiredby theLhomi in theNepalese middle hills.This salt-graintrade,supplemented byothervaluableitemson eitherside, such as medicinalherbs,musk,vegetabledyes,pashminawool, paper,coral, turquoise,silverand gold, was not primarilyforuse but foronwardtrading. The goods exchangedwere verysimilarto thoseof theearlynineteethcentury (HamiltonI 8 I 9: I 56-7). By themid-twentieth century, however,therewereno martsor entrepots.Tibetansaltwas acquiredin theborderregionforx amount of rice and then transportedto the middle hills where it was barteredwith Gurung,Rai, etc. farmersfory amountof rice.This ricewas thentakennorth and barteredagain forsaltat a ratewhichwould give theLhomi an operational surplusforthenextcycle.This barterwas carriedoutbetween'knownfamilies' and ofteninvolveddelayor debt(bulon). There is evidence from the Dolpo region furtherwest that in the early twentieth centurythesalt-graintradewas conductedwithestablishedexchange of'primitivetrade'(Jest ratesand an absenceofcompetition,i.e. it had features I975: I64). But thiswas fragile.The disastrouseffect on exchangeratiosof the floodof Indiansaltin the southfromthe I920'S onwards,and of theshutting down of Tibetansaltsuppliesby theChinesein the I96o's-70's, have been describedby Rauber(I982) fortheKhyampa,a groupofHimalayantradersin north-westNepal.9 An exactlysimilarprocesswas recountedby the Lhomi when I visitedin I979. The resultis thattheprofitable'business'end of their barterhas beendrastically reduced.Ithas ceasedtobe profitable to tradeTibetan saltin thesouth,and theLhomisfetchitnow onlyforpersonalconsumptionand for theiranimals. The main items of 'business' tradefromTibet today are medicinalherbsand musk, which fetchhigh moneypricesin the bazaars of southernNepal and northernIndia. Suppliesofothervaluablesand foodsfrom the North have dwindledtoo. The Chinese have officialtradingposts where Lhomi can barteror sell grainand hidesforsalt,consumergoods, or Chinese currency,but the ratesare less good thanprivatebarterwithTibetansin the communesat Lungde or further away at Karta. The Tibetans,however,can onlyopenlytradethepersonalsharesofwool, butter,salt,etc.allowedthemby thecommunes;anythingelseis illegal.SinceveryfewTibetansnow come over the borderinto Nepalese territory, the Lhomi have to travelnorthon foot, carryingheavybaggage over highpasses, sleepingin theopen or in caves, in orderto obtainthepastoralproducts.Formerlytheywaitedat harvesttimefor the nomads, who used sheep as transport,to come to them.Now, the most valuedand prestigiousproductsin theirculturearein shortsupply.The Lhomi, like theHumli Khyampasdescribedby Rauber,have had to fallback on their own farmsforsubsistence.To them,thismeansnotonlyback-breaking toiland a wretchedlyreduceddietbutalso a senseofinjustice. In thissame periodtheLhomi politicalsystemhas fallenapart.In the I930's and40's thevillageshad beenmoreorlessunitedunderone paramountgoba who managed to subordinatethe others.Goba Sinon was born in the village of Pang-Dok, but later moved to the southernmostLhomi village of Syaksila This content downloaded from 128.232.249.79 on Wed, 29 May 2013 07:27:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 56 CAROLINE HUMPHREY whichstandson a craggyoutcropdominatingthetrail.He controlledthearea he was able to keep controlof fromHedagna to theborder.Here, apparently, all traffic and takea taxon goods movingthrough,as didhispredecessorsofthe earlynineteenth century.He maintainedhispositionthroughforceofarmsand was able to keep officialsof the Nepali stateat bay. His power was probably visitin the I950's alreadydiminishedby thetimeof von Fiirer-Haimendorf's (von Fiirer-Haimendorf I975: i i6), and today his descendantsare gobas of separatevillagesand have littlebutancestralprestigeleft. sincetheLhomiare Regionalbarterin theArunValleyhas also beenaffected, no longerable to giveTibetansaltin exchangeforrice.Many morepeople than previouslynow traveldown to the middlehills fortwo to threemonthsin winter,doing menialwork on Gurung,Rai, etc. farmsforpaymentin rice, othergrains,hidesand animalcarcasses.In principle,theLhomis' pay,whichis alwaysinkind,canbe takennorthagaininspringfortradewithTibetduringthe summer,butinpracticemanyofthemhavesuchsmallfarmsthattheyneeditall forsubsistence.The ratesof pay are highlyvariable.If a Lhomi arriveswitha large numberof dependantshe may receivenothingfor the winter'swork exceptfood and shelterforhis family.RicherLhomi, on theotherhand, can eitherremainin theirvillagesor use thewintermonthsin tradingventuresin the southernbazaars. From thiswe see thatthe large-scaleeffectsof a bartereconomy,like any may be unequal, even though economy based on 'commodity'transactions, In barter each particularexchangeis by definition equal in thecircumstances. there are no social mechanismsstrongenough to ensure a stabilisationof exchangeratiosin the face of externallyproducedchangesin supply.This is unlikethekindof 'primitivetrade'networkalludedto by Polanyiand analysed by Sahlins,where,despiterisesin theexternal'prices'ofitems,theywere still tradedforthesamenumberand typeofgoods in theinteriorovera considerable periodof time.We also see fromtheannualcycleof productionand exchange thatthe moderneconomists'suppositionsabout 'transactioncosts' in a barter economyaremistaken.Who produceswhat,whereandwhen,is customaryand well-knownin theregion.The searchforcoincidenceofwantsis notnecessary, sincethetimeand place ofbarterforcommonitemswas establishedlong in the past. Activitiesare dovetailedand combined,such thattransport, storageand waitingcostsare minimised. barteroffarmingand forestproducehasprobablybeenleast The inter-village affected by thedeclinein long-distancetrade.It continuesas before,dominated by the barterof Lhomi potatoes(introducedc. I840's, Hooker I854: 240) for grainsfromthelower villages.In autumna streamof people fromall over the nearbymiddlehillstrudgeup to theLhomi villagesbearingbasketsof grainfor exchange.They tradeusuallywith'knownpeople',thoughotherwisewherever theycan.10 of moneyis thatit One common argumentof economistsfortheefficiency limitsthe numberof price quotationsnecessary.All itemscan be quoted in money, whereas in a bartersystem everythinghas to be quoted against everythingelse. In practice,thisis not the case. Althoughthereare no clear 'spheresofexchange',manyitemsarenevertradedforone another.The reasons This content downloaded from 128.232.249.79 on Wed, 29 May 2013 07:27:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CAROLINE HUMPHREY 57 forthisare usuallypurelypractical,e. g. cattleare too valuable to barterfor amountsof grain.Barter,in practice,followslimitedand welltransportable known'tracks'. The Lhomitodayhaverelatively littleeverydaycontactwithmoney.Chinese moneyis notacceptedin Nepal, norvice versa.But moreimportantthanthisis thefactthatmoneyis notneededforsubsistencefarming:theLhomi do notuse bought tools, fertilisers, etc., and while theywould buy ploughingoxen or itslivestock.Even statelandtaxes, cows iftheycould, theaveragefarminherits ifnecessaryin grains.In everydaylife whichare small,are paid to thegyembus moneyis onlyabsolutelynecessaryforbuyingbazaaritemssuchas cookingoil, keroseneand lamps, iron,cottoncloth,and Westernor Ayurvedicmedicines. belt.But once in a whileeveryLhomineeds Lhomi arenot yetin thetransistor large sums of money to pay fora wedding,a funeralor a sacrifice.On these occasionstheytakeout loans, a subjectto whichI shallreturnlater. The nearestbazaar is at Khandbariin the middlehills,some fivedays walk fromthe Lhomi villages. People make occasional tripsthereto sell Chinese manufactured goods, medicinalherbs(HumphreyI980; Burbage i98i), eggs, garlic,pigs, bristles,or beer made fromrice or millet.Most people make no surplusmoneyfromthis.Some Lhomi, bothmenand women, takeportering jobs in themiddlehillsto earnmoney,but thisagain has limitedpossibilities: thereis littletimeto sparefromthefarms,and theLhomiarein competitionfor thisworkwiththeRais, Gurungs,etc.who liveon thespot.Also, Lhomidislike and resenthavingto takepaid workofanykind.All ofthismeansthattheflow of moneyintotheLhomi villagesis verylimited. From this briefsurvey we can see some of the conditionsfor a barter economy. (i) Thereis a low moneysupply,and absenceofmarketsin land and labour. Culturally,the people are not 'hooked on' goods importedfromthe nationaleconomy. (2) The region,because of its ecological diversity,has a certainspecialisationofproduction.(3) Thereis an absenceofstatecontrolofthe economywhichwould siphonoffsurplusintoa largesystemofredistribution, as was thecase forexamplein theIncaverticaleconomy.Lhomipoliticalcontrol has now disintegrated.(4) There is no widelyinstitutionalised systemof 'gift exchange',nor is theresociallyregulatedcontrolof traderates,i.e. bargaining is possible forall goods. (5) Barteris carriedout by individualsbelongingto householdswhichdo not requiremoneyforessentialsubsistence.(6) Regional productionand exchange is well-knownand predictable,so that thereare establishedpatternsof dovetailingthetimesand places of barter.Partnersare knownto one another,especiallyin delayedexchange(cf.GoodhartI975). Exchangeratios I now takeup thequestionofbarterexchangeratiosin greaterdetail,as I believe conditionsthroughtherangeofproducts.It was themto be subjectto different statedabove thatthepossibilityofbargainingis a conditionforbarter,butdoes thisimplythatexchangeratesaredominatedby supplyand demand? The Lhomi materialseemsto show thatthemorewidelyproducedan itemis, thelesslikelyitis to be subjectto 'interference' withtheworkingsofsupplyand This content downloaded from 128.232.249.79 on Wed, 29 May 2013 07:27:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 58 CAROLINE HUMPHREY demand.This appearsto be onlycommonsense.Itis also a pointwell-knownin 'economicanthropology',e.g. Bohannan'slowest'sphereofexchange'among theTiv (Bohannan& Bohannan I968). However, we can onlysay thatbarter ratiosforsuch productsappearto correspondmoreorlesswithwhat a 'market equilibrium'rate mightbe. In fact,of course, no such rate is visible. It is somewhatcomplexto demonstrate this,butletus startwithmaize-saltbarterin autumnI979. Maize becomes cheaperin relationto salt as one travelssouthwardsin theArunValley. Kimathanka(north) PangDok Syaksila(south) i i i maize = maize= maize= i i- salt salt 1/3salt11 This in itselftellsus littlebecausetheseratiosmightindicatethatmaizebecomes scarceras one goes north,or thatmaizeis equallycommonin all ofthevillages, more butthatsalt,whichwe know is obtainedin Tibet,becomesprogressively expensivethefurther away it is bartered.Or theymightindicateboth. Indian saltcanbe boughtin Khandbaribazaarformoney.In PangDok thetwo kindsof salt have more or less equal value againstotherthings,despitethe factthat foritstaste.The explanationforthisis thatIndiansalt Tibetansaltis preferred has to be paid forin moneyand can onlybe acquiredsome six dayswalk away, while the borderwith Tibet is only two days away. The supplyof maize is equally problematic.No adequate surveyof the countlesstinyfieldsof the producershas everbeenmade. We canbesttryto explaintheratiosbylookingat maizein relationto anotheritem,e. g. potatoseed. Kimathanka Pang Dok Syaksila Angla (nearKhandbari) i maize = 2 potatoseed i maize = I 1/2potatoseed i maize = i potatoseed i maize = 1/2 potatoseed We see thatmaize variesagainstpotatoseed as it goes northin muchthesame proportionas it does againstsalt (maize become threetimesmore expensive againstbothsaltand potatoesfromSyaksilato Kimathanka).This concurrence would suggestthatmaize does actuallybecome scarcerthefurther northone goes, and thiswould seemto be confirmed byLhomiimpressionsoftheamount of maize planted.The rateschangefromyearto year:in Pang Dok in a yearof poor maize harvest2 unitsof potatoesobtainonly i of maize, but 3 in a year whenmaizeis plentiful.All ofthissuggeststhatthereis a grosscorrespondence betweenbarterratesand supplyand demand. Withineach village,barterratesforthesebasic productsare consistentwith one another.I shall give here rates for I979 in Pang Dok as statedby the of villagers.This may be confusingto readbut it is an accuraterepresentation ethnographicreality.The data are re-expressedin termsof i unit of rice as numerairein the table. However, it is importantto realisethatLhomi do not thinkin termsof a numeraire. 3 potatoseed = 2 maize/millet i salt = 2 maize /millet This content downloaded from 128.232.249.79 on Wed, 29 May 2013 07:27:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CAROLINE HUMPHREY 59 Ifrateswereconsistentwe would expectto findthati saltwould exchangefor3 fromthedata: potatoseed, and thisis confirmed I salt= 3-4 potatoseed. to maizeor milletforfood,butfetchedalmostthesamerate Rice was preferred in barterbecauseit was possibleto exchangeitin Tibetat equal rates. i rice= 1/2 salt Consistentwiththisis: i rice= i + maize/millet 2 rice= 3 potatoseed Workalso enteredthebartereconomy: i day's labour = 2 unitsmaize/millet hirepairploughingoxen perday = 4 dayslabour hirepairploughingoxen perday = 8 unitsmaize/millet Barterratesin Pang Dok in I979 expressedin one unit(kathi)ofrice. * represents absenceof transaction. Rice Maize Millet Potatoes Workday Oxen hire Salt Rice * Maize I+ * Millet Pots. Workday Oxen hire Salt I + I 1/2 1/2 1/8 1/2 I- I 1/2 1/2 1/8 1/2 I 1/2 1/2 1/8 1/2 * * * * 23 * 1/4 * * * in theinternal Thereis consistency villagebarterexchangeratiosforcommon produce(e. g. all grains,salt,chillies,garlic,vegetables,butterand local meat) which would suggestthat'marketforces'are at work here.But, otheritems, such as clothes,Tibetan woven aprons,boots, yak tails,Tibetan driedmeat, exchangeforone rugs, gem stones,etc., which are barteredless frequently, anotherand forthe agriculturalproductson an ad hocbasis and withoutany about bylack ofinformation consistency.This can be explainedconventionally thecost of obtaininginformation beinggreaterthan comparabletransactions, theestimatedsavingof a lower price(the'thinmarket';cf. Stigleri96i) but I would account forit ratherby the social practiceof barter:some degree of is unavoidablein frequent local exchanges, comparison,andhencecompetition, but not in distantor infrequentbarter.But in eithercase it is not lateral comparison,but theprocessof bargainingbetweentwo people, which determinesthe'price'. But let us look more clearlyat what is reallygoing on. There are two importantpoints: (a) the lack of standardunitsof measurement,and (b) the hiddeninequalitiesbehindthe'traditional'placesand timesofbarter. In theUpper Arunthereare threedifferent scalesof measurement operative: (i) Nepali measuresofweightand volume; (2) Tibetanmeasuresofweightand volume; (3) Lhomi measuresof volume,themainone beingthekathi,a round pot with straightsides. While Nepali and Tibetan weightsand measuresare thisis farfromtrueinthecaseoftheLhomiones. (Jest moreorlessstandardised, This content downloaded from 128.232.249.79 on Wed, 29 May 2013 07:27:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 60 CAROLINE HUMPHREY (1975: i68) remarksforDolpo, 'A chaque maison, sa mesure'.) The kathiin is oftendescribedas 'a largekathi','a smallkathi',etc.Some goods are particular commonlymeasuredin one seriesand othersin another.Lhomi use different seriesattheTibetanborder,in theirown villages,andinthesouth.This makesit difficult forthem(or us) to compareexchangeratesfordifferent goods. This is an importantfactorbehindtheabsenceofa commonstandardofvaluein barter. Barter,thoughequally 'commodityexchange'is radicallydifferent fromthe monetarymentality.Most Lhomi could only make approximateguessesas to the conversionof one set of measuresinto another.The same lack of abstract measurement appliesto productionas well as exchange.Lhomiusuallyestimate fieldsizes by the amountof x or y graintheysow in them.But thisis largely guesswork,as theyrarelyweightheseed and almostneverweightheharvest.12 No doubt,iftheysold theirharvestin a bazaartheLhomi would weighit. But theydo not, theybarterit. This meansthatit is impossibleforthemto assess 'profit'againstcostsofproduction. Letus taketheexampleofa poor farmer, Kun-top,fromPang-Dok. His main cropwas potatoes,whichhe grewforhis own consumptionand forbarter.He obtainedin exchangerice,maize,milletand chillies,mostlyfrompeople from outsidethevillage.He knew that3 kathisofpotatoeswereequal to 2 of maize thatyear(I979) and thatmilletand maize were thesame 'price'. However, he actuallybarteredhis potatoesin a unitcalleda tobo,a kindof largebasket.He thoughtthatone tobo was equal to about 30 kathis,but some were up to 40 kathisin size. His own tobo was a smallone, around20 kathis,he thought.What he was certainofwas thathe aimedto bartertwo tobosofpotatoesthatyearand thenhe would have enoughgrainsforhis consumption. In barter,the participantsonly have to examine what is offered.In the monetisedeconomy,on theotherhand,it is not theamountof goods but the Thus theLhomireachan impassein thebazaarof moneypricewhichfluctuates. if Khandbari.No-one in thebazaar truststhe kathi,and theLhomi therefore, theyare to sell anything,are requiredto hirea Nepali measureof volume,the kurwa.Pricesin thebazaararewell-knownand thereis a certainsocialpressure not to raisethem.13 Lhomi grumbleat thisand say thatthisrelativeinflexibility is one of themainreasonswhytheypreferbarter. is to makevillagebarterrates The effectoftheabsenceofexactmeasurement as quoted by the Lhomi more or less notional, almost ideological. They represent merelythebeginningofthebargainingprocess.As I havesuggestedin thecase ofmaize,thestateofsupplyofproductscanonlyreallybe guessedat. In barter,whatpeople knowis demand,and themutualadjustmentofdemandsis a social relation.For thisreason,the mostimportantfactabout barteris thatit takes place betweenindividualswho are socially'understood',whetherthey 'ethnicgroups'. Part of the calculationis the belong to the same or different extentto whichpeople can trustone another. Let us look now at relationsofdominationin barter.14 In thecase ofcommon produceperhapsanydisadvantage(intransport costs,timingofthetransaction, etc.) takesan 'economic'formwhichcan be adjustedvia exchangeratios.But in thecase of goods forwhichsomethinglikea monopolycan be maintained,for examplethevestigesofthewool tradein theUpperArun,thecustomary'track' This content downloaded from 128.232.249.79 on Wed, 29 May 2013 07:27:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CAROLINE HUMPHREY 6i unequalrelationbetweenethnic of bartermightseem to establisha persistently thatitis here groups,suchthatone sidecandictatetermsoftrade.Itis significant thatrelationships of debtalso flourish. Thewooltrade:emergence ofa monopoly centurythetradein wool fromTibetwas one ofthemost By thelatenineteenth importanteconomicactivitiesin theregion.Certainlyby thebeginningof the twentieth centuryandprobablyearlierthistradewas monetised(Bell I928: I I7i 8). SincetheLhomi alwaysobtainedmostof thewool fortheirown use from the exchangewith the Tibetan nomads theyhave neverowned many sheep pastureson this themselves,nordid theyplace muchvalueon theirown inferior side of the Himalaya. At the beginningof thiscenturytheirleaderssold the rightsof use in thepasturesto theGurungs.The positiontodayis thatGurung sheepswamp theonlyavailablepastures,whichareLhomipastures. Sheep in theUpper Aruntodayare of theNepali Baruwal variety,different fromtheTibetansheep,and Lhomi have no expertisein thewashing,dyeing, spinning,and weavingoperationsforwool oftheBaruwaltype.The Gurungs, of Baruwal on the otherhand, are the regionalspecialistsin the manufacture woolen rugs(radi),jackets,capes,etc. Virtuallyall Gurunghouseholdsspinand weave, even if theydo not own sheep. The fewLhomi who own sheephand overall oftheirwool to theGurungs,eitherto womenwho come up to fetchit, or to shepherdspassingthroughLhomi villageson theirway to and fromthe pastures.Lhomi take money, or goods measuredin money,fortheirwool. They can expectto gain fairlylargesums (some 350 Rs forthewool fromten transport coststo Gurungvillages, sheepin a year).Wool pricesinrupeesreflect and are identicalforeveryone.Althoughtheyhave risenin thelast fiveyears (I975-80) by about 1/3, thisis onlykeepingstepwiththerisein wool pricesin Kathmandu (seenote20). rareforLhomiactuallyto sellwool in a simultaneous But in factitis relatively transaction,since theyhave usuallytakenout a loan in advance againsteach season's wool crop. The Gurungfarmersknow exactlyhow manysheepeach ownerhas, and theyarepreparedto pay in advanceat slightlylower ratesthan practicein theHimalayanwool trade.Otherfamilies normal,a time-honoured can obtaina loan of3oo Rs in advancepaymentforherdinga Gurungflockfora season. But most Lhomi are forcedat one timeor anotherto takeout money loans toutsimple.Interestratesareveryhigh:5 RS a monthor 6o RS a yearfora loan of I00 RS, witha surcharge(tekki)of I2 RS.15Avoidanceofrepaymentis frequent.Such loans are veryrarelytakenout by one Lhomi fromanotherand thenonlywitha good deal ofpersuasion.In suchcases loans are oftenin grain ratherthanmoneyand theratesarelower (25 RS a yearon I00 RS loan, witha tekkiof 5 RS or one day's labour). The givingof loans is accompaniedby a blessingfromthe donor. Loans are usuallytakenout at lifecrises,when it is necessaryto buy in pigs, chickens,liquor,etc. forfeasts.But theycan also be used, like othervaluables,such as jewelleryor livestock,to startoffa trading venture.Such loans and valuablesare thespringwhichenablea fewindividual Lhomi tojump clearfromthemaze ofpettybarteroperations. This content downloaded from 128.232.249.79 on Wed, 29 May 2013 07:27:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 62 CAROLINE HUMPHREY It is theGurungfarmers withan interest in thenorthwho giveoutloansandit is apparentthattheoperationis notunconnectedwiththepasturesituation.The Lhomi have begun to make claimsthattheyare legallyentitledto have their pasturesback. In any case, Gurung shepherdsare dependenton Lhomi for allowingthempassage, forstoringprovisions,and givingshelterin thenorth. The ultimateownershipof the pasturesis the leverwhich Lhomi can use to counterbalancetheGurungwool trademonopolyand to ensurethecontinued availabilityof loans. Lhomi avoid takingloans frompeople theywork forin winterand theyspreadthenumberof creditorsas widelyas possible,i.e. they are carefulnot to become too dependent.Lhomi maintaina defiantly separate culturefromthe Gurungs.Nevertheless,it is perhapstheincreasingGurung controlof the money supply to the Lhomi which is reflectedin the recent electionofa Gurungas a panchayatofficialfora Lhomi ward.16 I have been discussingthewool tradein thecontextof 'barter'and thismay seem odd in view of the factthateven Lhomis sell wool formoney. In fact, moneyitselfentersthebarter'system'. value in different Money has a different villages,in termsforexampleofrice or labour.17 It also has a different valuein thesamevillagein relationto one type ofproductratherthananother,just as othervaluablesdo.18 The variationin the value of moneyin different villagescould be explainedsimplyby the money supply. We could rememberhere the situationdescribedby Bell for Tibet in the I920S (see p. 54): in yearswhen therewas plentifulwool forexport, rupeesfloodedin, and thevalue of Tibetangoods againstrupeeswentup (i.e. theycost more rupees). On this analogy we could explain the high money price of rice in certainLhomi villages by the greatervolume of sales from these villages resultingin a largermoney supplyin them. But in this case, the moneypricesof all goods would be highin thesevillages.But thisis not so. The explanationof thefactslies in thestrategic positionoccupiedby various goods and moneyin the different villagesin thebartersystem.In Pang Dok, althougha relativelyfertilevillage, people simplydo not normallyaccept moneyforrice.Rice can be used bothas highprestigefoodand as a bartergood in thetradewithTibet two dayswalk away. Money, on theotherhand,is only usefulin the bazaar, five days arduous walk away. Potatoes and garlic are occasionallysold for money in Pang Dok because they are produced here fortrade,and are no use in theTibetanbarter.The same is trueof specifically wool. But people herewantwages in grains,notmoney.Contraryto orthodox itis muchbetterin economicviewson money,evenin termsofexchange-value, the'sink'to be paid in grainsthanmoney.The factthatwage labouris normally paid in grainsthus reflectsthe relativelystrongbargainingpositionof employees. This is what one would expect in a village with so few landless households. we do nothavethedatato discusspricesandexchangeratiosin Unfortunately relationto productivecapacitiesandregionaldemand.However,itis possibleto make some generalconclusions.The amountof grainor moneypaid in wages ofthelocation(Syaksilais a poor villageand does notcorrelatewiththefertility yethashighgrainwages andlow moneywages17), norwithan equal subsistence This content downloaded from 128.232.249.79 on Wed, 29 May 2013 07:27:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CAROLINE HUMPHREY 63 betweenPang Dok or Chemtang levelforworkersin all villages(thedifference and Syaksilais considerable).Essentially,money,grain,and workarebartered between forone anotherin each location.Lhomi do notexploitthedifferences in ratesis an indicationof thelack of villages.The extentoflack of consistency of societyand henceoftheeconomy. integration andculture Barterinsociety Money is not used to measurethe common productswhich are bartered.A corollaryof thisis thatsmall amountsof moneyare not added up or saved to ofLhomiwithregardto moneyis often acquirethings.The 'windfallmentality' commentedupon by theirneighbours.Iftheyhave money,theyspendit,often on drink.Iftheyneeda largeamountofmoney,theyborrowitorsellsomething so as to obtaintheamounttheyrequire.I cannotpossiblyagree,forsucha case, withtheeconomistswho arguethatbartergives riseto monetisation.On the contrary, moneyhas a tendencyto sinkintobarter. used in this'barter'fashion. Of course,moneyis not always,or necessarily, Lhomi can operatein thebazaaras cannilyas anyoneelse,notthatthebazaaris a perfectmarketbyanymeans(Saganti968-9;Jones i980). But insidetheLhomi economymoney'disappears'becauseitis notaccumulatedas a goal ofwealth.A Lhomi counts himselfrich by virtueof ownershipof land, livestock,and valuablessuch as jewellery.A richman or woman is honouredforsponsoring specialrituals,requiringbeer,grains,butter,meat,etc.,at thenumerousgompa temples.But virtuallyno-one can affordto do thisnow. The richerLhomi, of thejimi(original)clans,aremembersofassociationsattachedto templesforthe paymentof the costs of regularmonthlyrituals.These associationsare egalitarianin thesensethata groupofwealthyfamiliestakesitin turnto providethe expenses,and all membersof thevillageparticipatein the feastwhetherthey have made provisionor not.19 Money thustendsto be rapidlyconvertedinto in lowland Nepal maywell play a partin this.20 goods. Recentsevereinflation The expectationthatin thefutureone will be poorer,notricher,and thatother people also will be poorer,whichis theLhomi experienceof thepast decades, inclinespeople to preferthe immediacyof barter.Poor people, indeed,who experiencehungerin bad years,have littlechoice. In thepast therewas not such a markedtendencyto convertout of money. were This is becausetwo kindsofmoney,as metallicvalueandas statecurrency, stilllinked. Until quite recentlythe Indian silverrupeehad an intrinsicmelt down value, as did variousTibetanand Chinesecoins(up to I939 therupeewas 92 per cent.silver,thereafter 5o percent.untiltheend ofBritishrule). But this was less importantthantheirculturalrole as signifiers of 'treasure'.Among ordinaryLhomi, silvercoinsweremelteddown to makebraceletsor belts,but oftentheywereusedinjewelleryas coins.All Lhomistilluse old Indianrupeesas indicationsof wealth, sewn onto women's hats. In Khandbari thereis a know how to weld ringsto tradein old coins,and Lhomi craftsmen flourishing themand polish themup fordisplaypurposes.Goodhart'slogical deduction that the absence of monetarypayment as the normal form of economic seemsto be transactionwould requirethedemonstration of credit-worthiness This content downloaded from 128.232.249.79 on Wed, 29 May 2013 07:27:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 64 CAROLINE HUMPHREY borneout by theLhomi practice-paradoxicallyby theuse of 'money-turnedas a signifier. into-treasure' To some extentmodernNepalese currencystillretainsan internalrole as a 'valuable'. This is at odds withthementality ofthebazaar,butlessso eitherwith barteror with ceremonial-status payments.A ritualgiftof 6i RS is stillan essentialtransferfrom the bridegroom'sside to the bride's at marriage(a transactionbetween groups of different status). But in barterthe money exchangedfora valuablecomesitselfto havesomethingofthevaluableaboutit. This is because the mentalityof barteris one of equal exchange. In a fully monetisedeconomy it is betterto hold money than goods. But in a barter economy,havingmoneyratherthangoods mayor maynotplace someoneat a directadvantage,andtheLhomialwaysbehaveto one anotheras ifmoneyisjust another,ratherhonourable,'good'. This mustbe determinedby a psychology tendingtowards 'immediatereturns'(cf. Woodburn I980), since Lhomi disregardwhatwe know fromAristotle:that'evenifwe happento wantnothingat the moment,money is a sort of guaranteethatwe shall be able to make an exchangeat anyfuturetimewhenwe happento be in need' (I895: 5' I4). in barterofcallinguponan abstractly Itis perhapsbecauseoftheimpossibility expressed'just price' (thisillusion being createdby the idea of money as a measure of value) thatbargainingitselfis decorous, markedby silencesor absences, as people retreatto 'consider'. We may compare this with the confrontationalmode of higgling describedby Geertz for the monetised oftherealitiesof theparticular Moroccan suq,wheretheintensivedetermining deal coexistswithsome sortof extensivesearchforthegoingpricewhichalso seemstobethe'fairprice'(1979: 206-7). Inthesuqthe'generally acknowledged' itis a vexedandproblematic and the'equitable'arethesame,thoughadmittedly matterto establishwhat thismightbe. But theLhomi do not even try.They to 'fairprice'becomesan impossibility ensurethatthereference bytheirattitude to moneyand to measurement.Barterthusabolishesabstractjustice (and the need to appear'honest'in relationto generalor externalcriteria),and replacesit This withwhateveris consideredbythepartiesto bejustin theircircumstances. is truein a somewhathiddensense is arrivedat by bargaining.This samefeature of thesuq,butin barteritbecomesovertand dominant.We could see thisagain as a featureofatomisedsociety. Among the Lhomi thereis a continuumfrompettymoneytransactions or directbarter,thoughregularand thendelayedtradeby barter,to theoccasional withthosetransfers ofvalue whichare 'big business'.All thiscan be contrasted in statusbetweenclansand maintaining concernedwithreproducingdifferences hierarchicalinstitutions(see Clarke I95I). But thesekinds of paymenthave declinedto a minimumamong the Lhomi today,and the questiondoes arise whetherthisis a simpleresultofincreasedpovertyor somethingin thenatureof a 'social choice' engenderedby ideological change. I do not at presenthave to disentanglethesetwo factors.Certainly,egalitarianism enoughinformation is whattheLhomi todayadmire.People evengrumbleaboutotherswho keepa includesrelationsbetweenthe servant.It is notablethatLhomi egalitarianism sexes. Women have never previouslybeen eligible for inheritedpolitical inthepanchayatsystem position,buttodayseveraloftheelectedrepresentatives This content downloaded from 128.232.249.79 on Wed, 29 May 2013 07:27:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CAROLINE HUMPHREY 65 are women withtheirown households.Two of thesewere ebullientpersonalities,notespeciallyrich,but'merrywidows' withseverallovers.A wealthyand influential man, on the otherhand, told me thathe would not standforthe panchayatbecauseofficewas heldonlyfora shortperiod.In sum,theLhomiare in theprocessof reformulation of politicalvalues, to some extentinducedby in thestateofNepal, butalso fuelledby an anarchic theirgradualincorporation individualismof theirown. It seemedto me in I979 almostas though,aliento Westernpractice,economic transactionswere undertakenwith seriousness borderingon solemnity,whilepolitics,at anyrateofthepanchayat,was a realm ofdisrespectandhilarity.Goingdown thetrailto attendmeetings,thecloserthe Lhomi deputiesapproachedthe 'Gorkha' centreof Khandbarithe more outrageoustheirbehaviourbecame. For theLhomi, thepinnacleofbarteris theoccasionalbig businessdeal. This is normallyconductedbetween 'known people', oftendistantkin, or 'ritual 21 or kinsmenofritualfriends. A deal is oftenprecededby thegivingof friends', minorsolicitorygiftsand a ritualscarf.The arrangements requirediscussionand time.Much of thistradeis illegaland so thepartnershave to trustone another. The watch-muskbartertrade,betweenIndiaand Tibet,is themostvaluableof all. The same channelsare used forlesservaluables,such as Tibetancarpetsor religiousobjects. They go, perhapsvia southerntowns such as Dhankuta or Dharan, to Lhomi contactsin Darjeelingor Kathmandu.A tradechainof this kinddoes not consistofpeople tryingto outwitone another,butoffriendsand accomplices. It is a gestureof friendshipto be asked to participate(unlike has a different Westernsociety,where 'friendship' meaningand is considered inimicalto business). In all thisthereare, and can be, no set prices.The only guide is the distant chimeraof a notionofwhatthemarketin theendwill bear.The ultimatebuyer is part of the capitalistsystem,Indian traders,Frenchperfumehouses, West Germancarpetimporters,or Westerntourists.This is thepartof the Lhomi bartersystemwhichis leastsubjectto the'traditional'channelsof theregional productiveeconomy:pricescan varywildlyandyetitis themostinvolvedwith relationsof friendshipand trust.Sahlins made the perceptiveremark,for 'primitivetrade',thatwhereratesaremoreorlessfixed,theonlyway to adaptto changesin supplyand demandin thelong runis to revisethepartnerships rather thantherates(I974: 3I2-I 3). Againit appearsthatthe'bartereconomy'differs radicallyfrom'primitivetrade' systems.Exchange ratesin bartertrade are decidedupon separatelyforeach transaction, i.e. thereis no expectationof a 'standardrate'overtime.This does not,however,have theeffect ofdestroying tradepartnerships, whichoftenincludeprolongedperiodsof negotiation.The timeallowed forrepayment,in the case of a delayedtransaction, can be very elasticand much depends on the energyand social weightof the individual. Some people makesdisastrouslosses and theirpartnerships lapse, not because thesocialrelationships haveended,butbecausetheyhave,forthetimebeing,no tradeto conduct.I knew of one man, Lhagpa, who arrivedfromTibet with threeyaks, worth several thousandrupees,which he entrustedto a distant Lhomi Khampa relativefora tradedeal. The businessfailed.Five yearslater, Lhagpa, a mildman,was stillwaitingfortheKhampato makea successfuldeal This content downloaded from 128.232.249.79 on Wed, 29 May 2013 07:27:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 66 CAROLINE HUMPHREY and repayhim. Lhagpa moved to Kathmanduandtookpaid work.Livinglikea churchmousewith the friendsof kin, he spenthis firstmonth'swages on a second-handsleeping-bagwhichhe sentoff,via a trustedfriend,to thesame Khampa fora deal whichwas to involvemedicinalherbs.Some monthslater whenI leftKathmandutheoutcomeofthistradewas stillnotknown. There is no radical break between this tradekind of barterand the rest. Essentiallyit is still conductedwithinthe community,and the commercial biting edge, the final sale, is done by middlemenof other ethnicgroups. dependshereon theinternalgainsofeachtransactor Economically,everything bearingsome relationto theoutsideprice.Lhomi have fairlygood channelsof information,but in facttheyare not very good 'big businessmen'precisely or boldnessto makethe because theythemselvesseldomhave theopportunity finalsale (in this theyare much more retiringthan other'Bhote' groups of Nepal). Losses are absorbedinto the complexweb of unfinishedtransactions which link exchangepartners.It is highlyprobablethatthereis not enough wealth around for these ever to be resolvedin the foreseeablefuture.The consciousnessof thisis one factoramong manythatmakes Lhomi refuseto give one anotherloans and to prefer,wheneverpossible, the simultaneous transaction. Conclusion are The conditionsin whichbarteremergesas a dominantformof transaction of barterwhichappearto be discussedon p. 52. Here I mentioncharacteristics important. i) The relationbetweenactualexchangeratiosin barterand presumed'equilibequilibriumbetweensupplyand derium rates' (i.e. the pricesrepresenting mand, cf. Marshall I890: AppendixF on barter)dependson the volume and frequencyof exchangeof theitemsin question.Goods widelyproducedand barteredare likelyto be exchangedat ratiosmost nearlyapproximatingto transactedmay be barnotional'equilibriumrates',while thoseinfrequently rates.Among the Lhomi, moneyfallsinto thislatter teredat quite arbitrary (the essentiallynon-monetised'sink' in Crump's categoryin thelocaleconomy terminology).In effect,thepracticeof barterincludingmoneyrendersspeculationabout 'equilibriumr4tes'pointless.The notionof a general'justprice'in absent. Aristotelian termsis therefore rateslies in thefactthatbarteris immediate,and 2) One reason forarbitrary beingimmediateis by its verynaturediscontinuous.For relativelyinfrequent exchanges people do not concern themselveswith what prices might be elsewhere.Even when barteris delayedand partof a complex of debts,the withone anotheror againsta standard do notcomparetransactions participants ofvalue(seealsoLeachI954: I45-6). ofdemandis paramountin barter ofimmediatesatisfaction 4) The requirement systems.This is one of theexplanationsof therejectionof monetisation.Very poor peopleliterallycannotaffordtokeepwealthinmoney.In thissituation,the is nota featureoflow culturaldevelopmentbuta absenceofexactmeasurement deliberatestrategyto ensurethe persistenceof one-to-onetransactions.The This content downloaded from 128.232.249.79 on Wed, 29 May 2013 07:27:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CAROLINE HUMPHREY 67 subjectionof moneyto thesame rationality indicatesthestrength of thebarter system.Here even moneyhas no temporality.The 'windfallmentality'thus as thestereotypes ofotherethnicgroupsabout does notindicateirresponsibility, theLhomi maintain,buta desireforfreedom. is likelyto be 5) Immediatebarteris an expressionof autonomyand therefore insistedupon in relationswithoutsiders.Directbarteralso dispenseswiththe about the need forpayment,i.e. it will be used whenthereis littleinformation ofpurchasers,or whenthereis a lackoftrust.These advantages credit-standing costsinvolved. of directbarterare so greatthattheyoutweighthetransaction who needseedpotatoesanddo nottrustthe Thus we findthatGurungfarmers, Lhomi to bringthemdown in timefortheplantingseason,will trudgefordays barter up and down thecraggyArunslopesto getto theLhomivillagesfordirect oftheirgrainsforpotatoes. with 6) Delayed barteroccurswherecreditis required,andthereis a correlation transacted themorevaluablegoods becausethesealso tendto be lessfrequently (see Douglas and Isherwood, I978). However, delayedbarter,as Goodhart ofknowledgeand trust.In thecase pointedout, can onlyworkin a relationship with otherethnic of the Lhomi, despitethe existenceof tradingfriendships groups,thisfeaturelimitstradenetworksand resultsin a curtailingof tradein valuablegoods. The generalimplicationofMarx's workis thatwealthaccrues throughcontrolof production.Here, however,we see thatthereare ways of profiting throughstrategicdominationofbarter-trade, thecontrolofthemeans of exchange. However, if barterratherthan monetarysale is the means of thetrustrequiredforbartertoinclude exchangewe cansee thatitis self-limiting: crediteffectively circumscribes economicoperations. 7) The preferenceforbarteris therefore relatedto underlyingpoliticalconditionswhich make autonomya paramountconsideration.The Lhomi have such that the economic entereda cycle of internalpolitical disintegration transfers reproducinghierarchy,whetherin the contextof affinalrelations, social chiefship,or the Lamaist church,have all but ceased. Many different groups (villages, clans, old settlers/newsettlers,lamas, households, etc.) coexist and do not wish to be subjectedto one another.This situationhas complex antecedents,both in the earliereconomic collapse of the salt-grain trade, which drasticallyreduced the amount of surplus the Lhomi could produce,and in theadventof Nepali politicalinstitutions, whicharedisplacing theLhomi ones. In relationto outsidepoliticalpower, theLhomi stillwish to maintainan autonomyallowing themsome degreeof controlover the Arun routeand theirmonopolyoftheTibetantrade. 8) While it is truethatbarteris conductedin an egalitarianmode, and most customaryor relativelylong-standingbarterarrangements adjust exchangein the long run barter,unlikecertain ratiosto transactioncosts, nevertheless systemsof 'primitivetrade'describedin theliterature, cannotsave people from the effectsof externalchangesin supply and demand. In an atmosphereof as betweentheLhomisand theirrespectedTibetannomad perfectfriendliness, friends,exchangeratesmay stillinexorablydrop. Indeed,barter,by hindering the emergenceof integrativeeconomic institutions, may make the situation worse. Barteris a responseto increasingpovertyon thepartofpeoplewho wish This content downloaded from 128.232.249.79 on Wed, 29 May 2013 07:27:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 68 CAROLINE HUMPHREY neverthelessto maintaintheirautonomy. Thus, while preservingthe same 'benign' cultureof economic independence,bartermay actuallypresideover realeconomicdesperationand instability. NOTES The fieldworkon whichthisarticleis based was carriedout in collaborationwiththeKosi Hill Area RuralDevelopmentProgrammein Nepal in I979. I am grateful to theNepali coordinator,Mr Kayastha,and to DickJenkin,JitMan Gurung,PremSubba, SamdupLama,JitBahadurGurung, AmbarBahadurRai, PremDutt andDorje Bhotefortheverygreathelptheygave me. Sean Conlin, Edgar Keller,JonathanZeitlin, StephenHugh-Jones,Samdup Lama, Simon Strickland,Lionel Carterand Mrs TseringSangmobroughtmaterialsto myattention duringthewritingofthisarticle. I am indebtedespeciallyto QuentinOutram and IstvanHont, and also to Edmund Leach, Keith Hart, StephenGudeman,WynneGodley,ParkerShipton,CharlotteHardiman,Paul Sant Cassia and Graham Clarke for discussionsrelatingto barter.I wish to thankmy mother,Margaret Waddington,withoutwhose supportI would neverhave writtenthisarticle. 1 Crumpin hissurveyoftheliterature could findonlythree'primitive'economiesdominatedby barter(I98I: 54). 2 'The logic ofthecaseis,indeed,almosttheoppositeofthat theclassicaldoctrine.The underlying orthodoxteachingstartedfromtheindividual'spropensityto barter;deducedfromit thenecessity thenecessityoftrade,eventually finally, oflocal markets,includingdivisionoflabour;andinferred, offoreigntrade,includingevenlong-distance trade.In thelightofourpresentknowledgewe should almostreversethesequenceoftheargument:thetruestarting trade,a resultof pointis long-distance thegeographicallocationofgoods, and ofthe"divisionoflabour"givenbylocation.Long-distance whichinvolvesactsofbarter,and,ifmoneyis used,of tradeoftenengendersmarkets,an institution to some individualsan buyingand selling,thuseventually,but by no meansnecessarily,offering occasionto indulgein theirallegedpropensityforbargainingand haggling'.(PolanyiI957: 58). in theUpper Arunbecauseit is establishedin the 3 I use the term'Lhomi' forthiscommunity in theregionis complexand Bista I967). In factethnicity literature(von Furer-Haimendorf I975; The Lhomiuse bothBhote (local Tibetan)andNepali namesforpeopleandplaces,and this shifting. is reflected in thepaper. situationwheremoneyis avoided or thequitedifferent 4 For example,in casesofhyper-inflation, in orderto evade theattentionof taxinstitutions ofthestate,as in present-day California. withouttheuse of money,to 5 As in socialisteconomieswherescarcegoods areallocated,often social categories,and frequentlypass fromthese groups to the populationat large via barter transactions. 6 Crumpnotesthat,quiteapartfromthefunctions ofmoneymentionedbyClower,'truemoney' indefinitely can onlyexistundercertainrealconditions:it mustbe physicallycapableofcirculating (i.e. it links the presentto the future);it must have a distinctiveidenityas money and no real importancefornon-monetarypurposes (e.g. it should not be consumable);and it should be in can appear and disappearin an limitedsupply.If theseconditionsdo not obtainthemoney-stuff uncontrolledway whichplayshavoc withitsrole of storingvalue, etc. For example,cowries,the mostwidelyused 'truemoney'ofthespecie(non-manufactured) type,nevercirculatedas moneyon theshoresoftheIndianocean wheretheycouldbe simplypickedup on thebeach,butonlyindistant placeswherethesupplywas controllable(I98I: 85). 7 It mightappear thatGoodhart,in suggestingthatbartertakes place insidethe face-to-face community,is reversingMarx's well knownpropositionthattheoriginofcommodityexchangeis communities(KarlMarx I887 vol. I: 9I-2). Only in dealingwiththe thebarterofproductsbetween outside world, Marx wrote, are individualsfreedfromthe social obligations('propertyrights') which rendertheirgoods inalienableinsidetheirown communities.Commodityexchange,i.e. has to takeplacewithoutsiders.This idea has takenroot ofalienableproducts,therefore transaction theories(Sahlins I972; Servet I98I-2; in anthropologyand been elaboratedin many influential GregoryI 980). Goodhart,however,reallyagrees.He is sayingthatbarteras simultaneousexchange and thatwhatwould occuris delayedexchange,i.e. as to be virtuallyan impossibility is so difficult creditand debt.Comparativelylittleofthemovementofgoods withina communitywould use the pricemechanism(i.e. barter),as opposed to internaldistribution by direction,and thesefewdebts This content downloaded from 128.232.249.79 on Wed, 29 May 2013 07:27:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CAROLINE HUMPHREY 69 would be settledin thecontextof generalmutualknowledge.Transactionsoutsidethecommunity would be forcedto use money.Althoughwe neednotagreewithhimaboutthevirtualimpossibility ofbarter,itis clearthatin bothcaseswe aretalkingabout'commodityexchange'in Marxistterms. 8 Lhomi own land in 'kipat' (communal) tenureas definedin Nepali law (see Caplan I970: intoindividualrights,butthe McDougal I979). Kipat tenureis in theprocessofbeingtransformed legal situationwas uncertainwhen I visitedtheLhomi in I979 and almostno land was boughtor sold. The mainreasontheLhomis gave forthiswas theunhelpfulattitudeof Nepali officialsat the landregistration officewhereLhomifeelata disadvantage,as veryfewofthemareliterateinNepali. (Nep.): grainor moneyis givento theownerin return Land is in facttransferred mainlyby bandhaki foruse, and ifthepaymentis notreturnedby a specifiedtimethelandis acquiredby theuser. 9 Raubersaysthat,aroundI900, one unitofriceobtainedI0 ofsaltattheTibetanmartofPurang, while it got 1/3 of salt in the districtof Bajura some 50 milesto thesouth,and only 1/5 or 1/6thin ofIndiansaltintothehillsfromtheI920'S Accham,another20-30 milessouth.Withtheinfiltration onwards, exchange ratiosof Tibetan salt with rice declinedsteadilyin the southerndistrictof Accham: I rice= 1/5th or1/6th salt I900 I rice= 1/4salt I925 i rice= 1/3or 1/2salt I935 I965 I rice = i salt oftheChineseinvasionofTibetbeganto be feltat theotherendofthetrade By theI 960's, theeffect route,and theamountof saltgivenforriceat Purangwentrapidlydown: I rice= 8 salt I964 I rice= 7 salt I974 I rice= 4-5 salt I976 I 977 I rice= 3-4 salt of Baljura In I 977, one unitofricecould stillbe barteredforonlyone ofsaltin thesoutherndistricts and Accham (RauberI982: I 5 I). 10 Baumgartner(I980: I35) notesthatSherpaeldersof each villagemeetannuallyto discussthe exchangepotentialof theirpotatocropand thenseta minimumexchangeratioas againstgrainsfor thatyear.Thereis a constantdangerthatricherhouseholdswould agreeto lowerrates. 11 These are the acceptedannual ratesin kathis.There was no mentionof changesduringthe season,whichsuggeststhatsomethingliketheSherpapracticemayhave beenin force(see above). 12 HenryOsmaston (personalcommunication) notesa similarlack ofprecisionin measurement among Ladakhis,despiteknowledgeof standardTibetan rates.Harrissuggests,in a paper with by volumeratherthanby weightis an manythemesin commonwiththisone, that'measurement indexof thedegreeto whichmonetaryequivalencein exchangeis avoided' (HarrisI982: 77). 13 Bazaar pricesare fixednationwideby the Nepali government forpaddy and wheat,and in Dhankutathereis also pricefixingover a wide rangeof basicproductsby a groupoflargetraders. Sellersarepreventedfromtradingat lowerbutnothigherprices.The reasonforthisis thedesireof tradersin general to keep purchasersfromtravellingdown to the Terai where prices would otherwisebe lower (Jonesetal. I982: 33-5). Althoughsuchinstitutionalised pricefixingdoes not occurin Khandbarithesame factorsapplythere. 14 The question of 'unequal exchange' in partiallymonetisedperipheraleconomies has been discussedby Platt(I982) and Harris(I982). Plattmaintainsthattheveryfeatureswhichlook least of affected by thecapitalisteconomy,suchas paymentof wages in maize,ensurethereproduction households lacking maize production.Low agriculturalpricesin marketsresultin an unequal value,but the exchangebetweenthepeasantsand therestof theeconomy.The effectis to transfer peasantsare not therebypressuredto leave theland. The resultis themaintainingof a reserveof labour availableat timesof seasonaldemand.This argumentclearlyhas relevancefortheLhomi. However,in thisarticleI am discussingthequestionof'unequalexchange'betweenLhomiandtheir immediatetribalneighbours,ratherthanbetweentheLhomiand thecapitalisteconomyas a whole, mainlybecause thereare so manystepsbetweentheLhomi and anythingresemblingcapitalismin Nepal. 'Unequal exchange'is nota phenomenonofcapitalismalone. It remainstrue,however,that werecapitalism(labourmarkets)to penetrate intothemiddlehillstheLhomiwould findthemselves in-'the positiondescribedby Platt. 15 The tekkior thegi(surcharge,deductedfromtheinitialloan or paid in labour,grain,etc.) is This content downloaded from 128.232.249.79 on Wed, 29 May 2013 07:27:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CAROLINE 70 HUMPHREY known throughoutNepal and is standardisedin given regions. Simon Stricklandnoted an interesting case amongGurungsofSiklisin CentralWesternNepal ofa 'strike'by debtorscausedby thesuddenraisingof thetekkirateby creditors.The debtorsbelongedto one set of clansand the creditorsto anotherhighergroup. The 'strike'consistedin refusingritualservicesto the upper groupsof clans(Strickland,personalcommunication). 16 Electionsto thepanchayatareexpensive.One of themainlamasofHatiyamanagedto gethis son elected,butonlyby sellingalmostall ofhis cattlein orderto give theelectorspresents,etc. 17 Chemtang i day's workis paid i.6 kathisgrainsor I0 RS Pang Dok I day's workis paid 2 kathisgrainsor 8-io RS I day's workis paid 2.4 kathisgrainsor I 5 RS Hatiya I day's workis paid 2.6 kathisgrainsor 4-5 RS Syaksila in whatthey Of course,workis notusuallypaid at all-exchange labourprevails.Employersdiffer offer(thefiguresabove areaverages).Thereis no freelabourmovingfromvillageto village.We see fromSyaksila,a day's workis paid progressively lessin grains,and thatas one proceedsnorthwards thisis whatwe mightexpectgiventheincreasingvalueofgrainsvis-a-visotherproductsfromsouth to north.But the money pay is much less clear. For one thing,grainsoftencost more to buy separatelyfor money than theirmoney value as wages. These prices do notreflecttransport costs-the moneypriceofricein Pang Dok, forexample,is farhigherthanthecostofbuyingricein the bazaar and payingportersto carryit north.When we comparethe moneypriceof grainsin One different villagesand thepaymentforworkin thesameplacesthereis a markedinconsistency. day's workis paid: Pang Dok 2 kathisgrainsor 8-io RS pay,butmoneypriceof grainsin i6 RS 2.4 kathisgrainsor I 5 RS pay, butmoneypriceof grainsis I 5 RS Hatiya 2.6 kathisgrainsor 4-5 RS, butmoneyvalueofgrainsin I3 RS Syaksila villages. The pointis thatitis virtuallyimpossibleto buy grainsformoneyin thenorthern neverexchangedforcommonproduceitcanmaintainvalueswhich 18 Because moneyis virtually For example,in Pang Dok I kathiofpotatoeshad a priceof2 RS, and as we saw, I areinconsistent. kathiofricebartersforI . 5 ofpotatoes.We would expectthemoneypriceofriceto be 3 RS, butin withmaize. Witha moneypriceforpotatoesof2 RS perkathi factitis 8 RS. Thereis thesameeffect and a barterrateof I maize to I. 5 potatoes,we shouldexpectthemoneypriceto be 3 RS perkathi. withtheculturalpreference forrice(8RS per However,in factit is 7 RS perkathi,whichis consistent conditionsintheTibetancommunes,itis possibleto kathi)and withthefactthat,becauseofdifficult barterall grainsin Tibet at equal rates,e.g. againstsalt. 19 These groupsareknownas go ('door') and seemto be similarto theTibetan'kidu'discussedby Miller(MillerI956) (myTibetanassistantassumedthattheywereidentical). 20 I am indebtedto Edgar Kellerforthefollowinginformation fromWestGermangovernment sources.Pricesin Kathmandu(I972-3 = IOO): I977 Meat and fish Ghee and cookingoil Herbs Vegetables Cloth Wool i66 I978 i8o I4I 20I I94 266 i6i Ig9 I52 I979 I980 198I i87 235 290 i85 262 202 275 23I 227 205 243 262 I58 I70 I77 i6i 203 239 I78 Between I972/3 and I978/9thepriceof raw coarsericein DhankutarosefromI.90 to 2.7I Rs/Kg, ghee fromi5.54 to 20.75 Rs/Kg, muttonfrom7.50 to I2.54 Rs/Kg and sugarfrom3.48 to 8.28 Rs/Kg. The priceof themainitemproducedby theLhomi,potatoes,roseby farless: fromI .32 ro mentionedtherise and constantly I. 85 Rs/Kg (Jonesetal. I 982: 37). Lhomi wereawareofinflation in wool prices,money(as opposed to grain)wages, and livestockprices. 21 The Lhomishave trading friends(trogpo female)amongtheTibetannomads. male,and trogmo but theyare not exclusive.An activetradermight These relationshipsare inheritedpatrilineally, (mit)with people of have 5-6 such friends.A few Lhomi also have more ritualisedfriendships 'Gorkha' ethnic groups. The mit ritual friendshipis commonly establishedbetween people distinctgroups,or betweenendogamousgroups,allowingan extension belongingto hierarchically ritualin the ofclose tiesin a societywhichis dividedand ranked.The relationinvolvesan initiating termsof address, presenceof a priest,promisesof help in timesof trouble,theuse of respectful I44 I53 This content downloaded from 128.232.249.79 on Wed, 29 May 2013 07:27:55 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CAROLINE HUMPHREY 7I obligations.Thereis andfunerary avoidanceofthemit'sspouse,no marriagebetweendescendants, arecommonlyinvolvedin tradewithone another, as to whethermiteri some debatein theliterature and theevidenceseems to suggestthatregionsof Nepal differin thisrespect(Gorer I938; Miller I956; Okada I957; CaplanI970; McDougalI979). In thecaseofLhomimitdo tradewithone another,and thekinsmenof mitarealso involved.In myexperience,Lhomisetup mitrelationships in orderto trade. REFERENCES London: Kegan Paul. ethics by F. 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